Dynamic stochastic EPEC model for competition of dominant producers in generation expansion planning by Valinejad, Jaber et al.
Citation:  Valinejad,  Jaber,  Marzband,  Mousa,  Barforoshi,  Taghi,  Kyyra,  Jorma  and 
Pouresmaeil,  Edris  (2018)  Dynamic  stochastic  EPEC model  for  competition of  dominant 
producers  in  generation  expansion  planning.  In:  5th  International  Symposium  on 
Environment Friendly Energies and Applications, 24-26 September 2018, Rome. 
URL: 
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/37776/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright ©  and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page.  The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full  items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
Dynamic stochastic EPEC model for competition of 
dominant producers in generation expansion planning 
Jaber Valinejad 
Bradley Dep. of Electrical 
and Computer Engineering 
Virginia Tech, Falls 
Church, USA 
JaberValinejad@vt.edu 
Mousa Marzband 
Dep. of Physics and Electrical 
Engineering 
Northumbria University  
Newcastle, Newcastle, UK 
mousa.marzband@gmail.com 
Taghi Barforoshi 
Dep. of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering  
Noshirvani University of 
Technology, Babol, Iran 
Barforoshi@nit.ac.ir 
Jorma Kyyrä and Edris Pouresmaeil 
Dep. of Electrical Engineering 
and Automation  
Aalto University, Espoo, Finland 
jorma.kyyra@aalto.fi 
edris.pouresmaeil@aalto.fi 
[12]. In [13], a probabilistic dynamic programming model has 
been addressed under presence of demand uncertainty in order 
to overcome the investment problem. In [14], a stochastic bi-
level model is presented as a means to investigate Dominant 
behavior of producers so that uncertainties are associated to 
demand and rival offers. In [15], a static model of a dominant 
producer vision (price maker) has been proposed. In [16], the 
problem considered in [9] is solved by Bender's decomposition 
in the presence of uncertainty in demand, non-strategic 
generation companies while the nature of planning is static. 
Reference [17] presents a bi-level multi-period framework 
which encompasses generation expansion planning (GEP) from 
a price maker perspective. A hybrid DP/GAME framework 
based on Cournot game is suggested in [18] as a solution for 
the generation expansion planning problem. In [19], expansion 
planning is undertaken for a set of non-strategic generation 
companies in the liberalized power market. A Conjecture price 
method is used in the second level of the aforementioned 
market. In [20-21], the investment of dominant producers is 
solved by EPEEC model without considering the uncertainty 
for one year. In addition, the strategic offers of producers are 
based on stepwise supply function. Multi stage planning by 
thri-level level model is done in [22]. In addition, to model 
operation mo 
In this paper, the GEP is developed in such a way that the 
strategy of all investors is modeled in a mathematical model 
form consisting of several dynamic stochastic MPEC 
(DSMPEC) which is called the dynamic stochastic EPEC 
(DSEPEC) model. The DSEPEC model is tested in dynamic 
approach under uncertainty in the demand growth which is 
modeled by discrete Markov model. The DSMPEC obviously 
considers offers from the stepwise supply function, which is 
more line with reality of power markets in comparison with 
other related models for instance Bertrand, Cournot, or 
conjectural variations.  
Followin the introduction, the rest of this paper will be 
presented as the following sections. In Section II mathematical 
formulation will be characterized. Different scenarios will be 
considered in Section III and a case study will be provided in 
Section IV, where the efficiency of the proposed is examined. 
Finally, the last section provides some relevant and beneficial 
conclusions. 
Abstract— This paper aims to presents dynamic stochastic an 
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (DSEPEC) 
model to invistigate the generation capacity expansion at a 
certain time horizon and the presence of dominant producers. 
The DSEPEC model is proposed while there is an uncertainty in 
the predicted demand, and it is modeled based on discrete 
Markov model. Each dominant producer is modeled by a bi-level 
optimization problem so that the first level and the second level 
provide models for the investment and operation decisions, 
respectively. The supply function equilibrium (SFE) is used for 
short-term electricity market. Then, each bi-level model is 
convert to dynamic stochastic mathemathical problem with 
equilibrium constraints (DSMPEC). To convert DSEPEC to an 
auxiliary MILP problem, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
conditions as well as primal–dual transformation. A sample two-
buses power network is employed for simulation and necessary 
analysis to confirm the efficiency of the proposed framework.  
Keywords— Generation expansion, EPEC, MPEC, multi-
stage planning, Dynamic stochastic model 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The security of supply is the most important feature of the 
operating system that should be addressed in the short and long 
periods of time [1-2]. It is worth mentioning that generation 
expansion must be coordinated with the growth of the demand 
to keep the balance between electricity generation and energy 
consumption in the long duration [3-4]. The generation 
expansion has become an intricate issue by entering the power 
generation industry into the competitive space which is 
implemented in order to improve the economic efficiency [5-7]. 
In limited competition space (incomplete), the independent 
system operator must have profound information as regards 
models and computational tools as a means to study the 
expansion behavior of the power generation sector under 
presence of uncertainty in power systems [8-10]. It is an 
essential point to apply appropriate model in order to 
understand the generation expansion and to be able to 
invistigate the influence of various markets on the investment 
sectors; consequently, scientists have been addressing a 
variety of generation expansion models to prevail investment 
issues. 
In [11] a bi level Cournot model has been presented for 
generation expansion planning. Correspondingly, the effect of 
transmission congestion is provided by the Cournot model 
in 
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
The mathematical formulation of the proposed model will 
be introduced in the following Subsections. A variety of 
indexes are used in this model, where w is an index for the 
scenario, r/r' show the indexes for years, t shows the index for 
the demand blocks, y is an index for the producers, i/k are 
indexes for the new and/or the existing generation unit of 
dominant producers, d is an index for demand. In addition, f 
represents discount rate and 
yriX
is the capacity investment of
new unit i of the dominant producer y in year r (MW). In 
addition, 
'
r
yrr iX is the available capacity of new unit i of 
dominant producer y in year r', in years after the installation in 
the year r (MW).  
A. The stochastic Bi-level model of each dominant 
producer 
      Firstly, the issue of each dominant producer to find 
optimized decisions (investment and offers) is formulated by a 
stochastic bi-level model. The first level present investment 
issue of a dominant producer y with a view to maximize the 
total profit present value of the investment which is expressed 
in (1). Kyri  and /  are annual investment cost of new 
generating unit i and Marginal cost of new/existing unit of 
dominant producer y(e/MWh). rtnw  is market price 
(locational marginal price). 
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The constraints in the first level include the bounds on 
investment options, limit on investment budget (2), minimum 
available capacity imposed by the market regulator (3) and the 
non-negativity of dominant offers. is the value of 
available budget for the investment of dominant producer y 
(M€). Furthermore, is the maximum load of demand d 
in block t (MW). A is supply security factor. 
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      In addition, as an obvious result of the dynamic nature of 
the proposed model, dynamic constraints are envisaged in the 
first level. Dynamic constraints values on the investment 
decision variables are represented in constraint (Eqs.4 - 6); 
where,  is the offered price from the new unit i of 
dominant producer y in year r', in the years after the 
installation in year r (€/MWh). 
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The outputs of the first level problem are consisd of the 
investment decisions of the producers and the offers thet they 
provide for the spot market. Market-clearing is expressed in 
the second level problem. An optimization problem is 
presented as the clearing of the market for various operating 
conditions, where the priority is to maximize the social 
welfare. Objective function of second level is given in Eq.7. 
 is Price bid of each demand (€/MWh). 
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The constraints of second level involve DC power flow 
equations, transmission network limitations, the limits of 
units’ capacity and uncertainty in demand. In this model, loads 
are envisaged to be flexible to the prices. Hence, they are not 
essentially supplied at their highest levels. The outputs of the 
second level model include the market prices (i.e., dual 
variables related to the constraints of power balance), which 
are fed back to the first level problem. The value of dynamic 
constraints on the production decision variables are illustrated 
in (8). 
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B. The DSMPEC of each producer y for DSEPEC model 
      The bi-level problem for producer y can be transformed 
into a one level problem (DSMPEC) by imposing Primal-dual 
transformation to the second level problems. Primal-dual 
transformation encompasses some constraints, i.e., primal and 
dual constraints as well as the strong duality equality.  
In view of the product of continuous variables, the strong 
duality equalities have nature of the nonlinearities; because of 
this, the aforementioned equalities cannot be easily linearized. 
The strong duality equality is obtained through using the 
primal-dual transformation. This equality is equivalent to the 
set of complementarity conditions as inequality constraints 
which can be obtained by the KKT conditions [22].  
In addition, complementarity conditions are nonlinear and 
highly non-convex. It should be noted that for linearizing, 
each complementarity condition of the following form 
00  ba  will be equivalent with 
   1,0,1,,0,0   MbMaba , so that M is
envisaged as a large enough constant. 
C. Dynamic stochasic EPEC (DSEPEC) 
 The joint consideration of all DSMPECs constitutes a 
DSEPEC.In this paper, total profit of all producers was 
selected as objective function. The summation of Eq.1 for all 
producers presents the minus total profit of all producers, 
which is presented in Eq.9. 
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      In addition to total profit of all producers, annual true 
social welfare (where production costs of units are 
considered), Annual social welfare (where dominant offers of 
units are considered) as well as Minus payment of the 
demands can be considered as the other objective functions of 
equilibria [20]. 
D. Converting DSEPEC to one level model 
Owing to the fact that DSMPECs are nonlinear, the primal-
dual transformation cannot be directly used as a means to 
formulate the optimality conditions of all producers. 
Consequently, by enforcing KKT condition to all DSMPECs, 
the optimality conditions for the DSEPEC are obtained [20]. 
The optimality conditions relayed to the DSEPEC encompass 
Primal equality constraints of DSMPECs, Equality constraints 
obtained from differentiating the corresponding Lagrangian 
related to the DSMPECs with respect to the variables as well 
as Complementarity conditions associated with the inequality 
constraints of DSMPECs.  
III. CONSIDERING THE UNCERTAINTY IN DEMAND
To reach the more reliable results in planning power 
network, importance of considering uncertainties is inevitable. 
In the proposed model, Markov chains is used with a view to 
model demand uncertainty. The demand growth is envisaged 
to be 10% and 8% so that related probabilities are 60% and 
40%, respectively in any case scenario for each year. Figure 1 
presents the uncertainty of Markov chain related to demand 
growth. In this paper, DSEPEC includes 16 scenarios for 5 
years. 
Fig. 1. Considered scenarios for the uncertainty associated with the 
demand growth 
IV. CASE STUDY
A network including two buses is considered as a case study 
depicted in Fig. 2. The information related to candidate unites, 
existing units as well as demands can be found in [21]. A five 
years horizon is considered for the planning, where each year 
is consisted of four different demand blocks. The value of 
annual demand growth is presumed to be 10% and the value of 
annual discount rate is presumed to be 8.7%, respectively. In 
addition, 75 million euros is considered for investment budget 
over the planning period.  
Fig. 2. Two-bus test network [15] 
     This DSEPEC model is solved by means of Solver 
XPRESS software GAMS. The simulation results of this 
model in case of static is compared with those of EPEC model 
presented in ref. [20] in order to validate high performance of 
the proposed model. According to the GEP results of [20], the 
total profit and total capacity constructed through the planning 
period for the case 1 of table 5 have been obtained as 11.83 
M€ and 200 MW, respectively. Also, the annual true social 
welfare (ATSW) is obtained as 20.13 M€ in this case. After 
validating the simulation results in this paper in the case of 
static approach, that model is extended to DSEPEC so that 
uncertainties associated with demand growth are considered. 
In addition, different options are considered for investment. 
 Table I shows the energy production of dominant producers 
in the planning period. The first Column in Table I refers to 
the planning year. The productions for each producer during 
the planning period are provided in the next columns. The last 
column provides the total production under planning period. In 
addition, the value of total production in the planning period is 
2634 MWh so that the share of dominant producers in this 
production is 29.51%, 34.15% and 36.34%, respectively.  
TABLE I.  THE ENERGY PRODUCTION OF DOMINANT 
PRODUCERS IN THE PLANNING PERIOD 
Year 
Production of dominant producers (MWh) Total 
Production 
(MWh) Producer 1 Producer 2 Producer 3 
1 278.141 1481.568 521.395 2281.104 
2 1651.628 1652.997 1856.413 5161.038 
3 1892.554 1860.255 2078.666 5831.475 
4 1477.468 1514.917 2389.141 5381.525 
5 2440.261 2449.193 2689.395 7578.849 
Total 7740.052 8958.930 9535.010 26233.991 
 Table II shows the generation expansion planning results 
for Tri-competition. The first column of Table II is referring to 
the planning year and the second column presents the total 
constructed unit and the base technology in the parenthesis. 
The average market prices are provided in the third column. In 
addition, the profit for each producer for the duration of the 
planning period and their investment are provided in the next 
column.  The total profit (M€) during the planning is perioded 
in the fifth columns whilst the last one illustrate Social welfare 
(M€). In this tripoly case, dominant producers invest a 500 
MW in the peak technology. So that dominant producers 2 and 
3 invest 300 MW and 200 MW in first and the fourth year 
respectively. The average price of all years is the same and is 
equal to 20.125. The profit of all producers in the planning 
period is 70.71 so that the share of dominant producers in this 
profit is 12.87%, 57.08% and 30.07%, respectively. Also, 
Social welfare is 127.98 in the planning period.  
Figure 3 shows the changes in social welfare compared to 
demand security coefficient changes. It can be figured out that 
the level of social welfare increases with the increase in 
demand security coefficient. 
Figure 4 shows the investment by dominant producers 
compared to demand security coefficient changes in the 
planning period. As depicted the investment increase and 
occurs in earlier years with increase in demand security 
coefficient while all investments are in peak technology. 
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Fig. 3. The changes in social welfare with respect to demand security 
coefficient changes. 
Fig. 4. The investment by dominant producers with respect to demand security 
coefficient changes in the planning period. 
Figure 5 shows the changes in energy production compared to 
demand security coefficient changes. The level of energy 
production increases with increase in demand security 
coefficient.       
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Fig. 4. changes in energy production compared to demand security 
coefficient changes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
       A dynamic stochastic EPEC model has been expressed to 
study interactions among dominant producers in generation 
capacity expansion. In this paper, the dynamic nature of the 
investment decisions has been considered in a network-
constrained electricity pool to find expansion planning equilibria. 
TABLE II.   GENERATION EXPANSION RESULTS FOR TRI-COMPETITION  
 Furthermore, various scenarios are considered to model 
uncertainties related to the demand growth. Discrete Markov 
model is presented to take into account uncertainties. 
According to the simulation results, level of social welfare 
increases with increase in demand security coefficient. Also, 
the investment increases and occurs in earlier years with an 
increase in demand security coefficient while all 
investments are in peak technology. In addition, the level of 
energy production increases with the demand security 
coefficient increase. As a future work, there is a need to pay 
especial attention to effect of investment incentives upon 
function of dominant producers in generation investment 
problem. In addition to generation expansion, transmission 
expansion planning can be considred to this model although 
that is an intricate problem. Also, considering impacts of 
availability of the gas transmission network in the proposed 
model is of high importance. 
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Year 
Total capacity 
added (base) 
MW 
Average 
price 
(€/MWh) 
Dominant producer 1 Dominant producer 2 Dominant producer 3 
Total 
profit 
(M€) 
Social 
welfare 
(M€) 
Total 
capacity 
added 
(base) MW 
Net profit 
(M€) 
Total 
capacity 
added 
(base) MW 
Net profit 
(M€) 
Total 
capacity 
added 
(base) MW 
Net profit 
(M€) 
1 300(0) 20.125 0 2.03 300(0) 7.58 0 3.42 13.03 12.73 
2 0 20.125 0 2.03 0 9.6 0 3.14 14.78 28.49 
3 0 20.125 0 2.02 0 9.82 0 2.90 14.73 29.57 
4 200(0) 20.125 0 1.57 0 7.31 200(0) 4.62 13.50 24.66 
5 0 20.125 0 1.45 0 6.05 0 7.18 14.67 32.53 
Total 500(0) 20.125 0 9.10 300(0) 40.36 200(0) 21.26 70.71 127.98 
